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In this paper we adopt Granovetter’s view expressed in his famous article ”Economic Action and
Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness” , where he argues that the concept of man in
economics is extremely undersocialized because it ignores the importance of social networks. In so
doing the incentives to mutual cooperation in social matching games in which the social network
is endogenously determined are studied. The main result shows that in atomized societies where
there is no information ﬂows between diﬀerent pairs of individuals and the rest of the society,
individuals choose either to form the maximal number of links possible or to form no links. Whereas
in embedded societies where information transmission is allowed, the type of social networks that
arise take diﬀerent architectures some of them symmetric and some of the asymmetric.
This allows us to improve our understanding of a wide variety of phenomena as occupational
mobility, informal credit markets in rural areas, cooperative formation, social capital, segmented
labor markets, international trade and so on. In partricular, the model results are used to explain
the concept of social capital , its beneﬁts and costs.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Grannovetter (1985) in his famous article “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness” argue that the concept of man in economics is extremely undersocialized because it
ignores the importance of personal contacts and networks of relations—what he calls the embedded-
ness of economic transactions in social relations— used for many people to achieve their goals. In fact
he argues that “the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing relation-
ships that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (p. 481). Granovetter,
however, does not postulate that the alternative to an undersocialized man is a oversocialized one
that fully internalizes the consequences of his actions for his network of relations or social contacts.
In fact he argues that “Despite the apparent contrast between under- and oversocialized views, we
should note an irony of great theoretical importance: both have in common a conception of action
and decision carried out by atomized actors. In the undersocialized account, atomization results
from narrow pursuit of self-interest; in the oversocialized one, from the fact that behavioral patterns
have an internalized and ongoing social relations thus have only peripheral eﬀects on behavior” (p.
485). What Grannovetter proposes is not to abandon the assumption of fully rational agents pur-
suing their own self-interest, but embed them in social structure were they are involved and make
decisions. This view is well-captured by the following quote: “My claim here is that however naive
the psychology (of rational choice) may be, this is not where the main diﬃculty lies—it is rather in
the neglect of social structure” (p. 506).
In this paper Granovetter’s view is adopted by considering a model in which the society is
conformed by inﬁnitely-lived individuals that during the ﬁrst period choose to form links—that is
they choose the social structure in which future transactions will take place. A link between any
two individuals is formed by mutual consent, links are assumed to be costly to form and they can
be of two types: good and bad links. After links are formed, individuals play a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with changing partners a la Kandori (1992), where the payoﬀs of the game depend on
whether a link is good or bad. Good links yield a larger payoﬀ than bad links. In each period
pair-wise matching occurs only between linked individuals, unlinked individuals remain unmatched
for the rest of their lifes.
A key aspect of the model is that information on how players have behaved in the past diﬀuses
through the social network only gradually. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that, player i is discovered
by player j right after a deviation with positive probability if and only if they are linked. When i
is not discovered right after he deviates, his defection will be forgotten in all subsequent periods.
Thus, information can range from atomized (people know only what has happened in their own
interactions) to comprehensive (people know what has happened in all previous interactions, and
everything about the game is common knowledge). The main implication of the assumption that
the probability of becoming informed is network dependent is that, in general, the architecture of
the social network has bearing on the extent of cooperation that the network can support in a self-
sustainable fashion. In addition, the information transmission mechanism assumed encompasses the
two most emblematic repeated game models: when the probability of becoming informed is equal to
one for each ij link, the model corresponds to the one in which everyone observes everyone else play
in each period, while when that probability is zero, the model corresponds to the one where there is
no information transmission between any given ij link and the rest of the society.
In this context the existence of pair-wise equilibrium networks—that is networks that are Nash
equilibrium and pair-wise stable— is established, and a characterization of pair-wise equilibrium
1networks in terms of a particular set of architectures is provided. In general pair-wise equilibrium
networks have the exclusive groups architecture; that is, networks that have distinctive groups of
completely connected players and a group of isolated players, yet in some cases for the same set
of parameters more than one pair-wise equilibrium network exist. A typical example of this, is a
parametrization in which the empty, the complete and an asymmetric network in which there is a
complete component and the rest are isolated players are pair-wise equilibirum networks.
There are certain feature of pair-wise equilibirum networks that are wortwhile to highlight here.
First, in some networks individuals are segregated in two distinctive groups: one group conformed
by good links but in which cooperation does not take place and another group formed by good and
bad links, but in which its members cooperate in each encounter. In addition, the size of the group
of cooperators is non-increasing in the probability that a given player’s partners become informed
about that player’s action in his last encounter. The reason being that for any number of links an
improved information transmission implies a larger expected punishment, and therefore less links
are needed to induce cooperation.
Second, in some networks individuals are segregated in two groups: one group of individuals that
cooperate among themselves and the rest are isolated individuals, and the group of cooperators is
in general composed of both, good and bad links.
Third, in some networks some individuals form links that are not proﬁtable. They do so because
in that way they increase the expected punishment, and therefore cooperation with some of their
links become self-sustainable. That is, unproﬁtable links serve as a kind of commitment device that
makes cooperation self-sustainable.
The results of the paper are used to gain a better understanding of the concept of social capital.
Social capital, in general, has entered economics as being an under-appreciated and independent
factor of production, which in general is considered to be complementary with human capital. The
reason being that human capital will amount to little unless the person having it can be in contact
to others to inform, correct, assist with and disseminate his work and/or ideas. Much of the interest
in social capital by economists has been fueled by deﬁnitions that include not only the structure
of social networks and social relations, but also behavioral dispositions such as trust, reciprocity,
and honesty and institutional quality measures such as rule of law, contract enforceability, and
civil liberties and personal characteristic as social skills, charisma, intellectual skills. Examples of
behavioral dispositions are LaProta et al (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997). The former reports a
positive correlation of some measure of trust and judicial eﬃciency and the latter between the same
measure of trust and growth rate1. An example of personal characteristic is Glaser et al. (2002) who
deﬁne social capital as a person’s social characteristics—including social skills, charisma, and of his
Rodolex— which enables him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions with others2.
Thus, economists studying social capital have more often than none adopted deﬁnitions of social
capital that make no diﬀerence between the resources available per-se and the ability to obtain them
by virtue of membership in diﬀerent social networks and that mix the consequences and determinants
of social capital. Those studies, empirically or theoretically, that have either or both problems are
bound to end up ﬁnding that successful people (nations) succed, as it is usually the case. In view
of this critique, we believe that a deﬁnition of social capital must be able: (i) ﬁrst, to distinguish
social capital from other forms of capital so that social capital can have a distinct meaning, and (ii)
1See Durlauf (2002) for a critique of the econometric methods used to identify the positive eﬀects of social capital.
2This deﬁnition however does not suﬀer from Portes and Landolt’s critique that social capital cannot be thought
of as a community based attribute.
2second, to allow to implement empirical strategies capable of identifying the empirical beneﬁts and
“costs” of social capital. The model analyzed in this paper allows us to propose a deﬁnition of social
capital that satisﬁes these two premises. Indeed, social capital is deﬁned as follows: An individual
social capital refers to the number and type of costly links formed by mutual consent with the goal of
achieving certain personal ends that cannot be achieved in the absence of them.
We do not intend to claim that these is “the” deﬁnition of socical capital but among the many
possibles one at least is capable of achieving the two goals proposed above. In addition to this, the
deﬁnition proposed is at individual level and not at the aggregate level. This avoids the problem
of aggregation that arises in deﬁnition based on collectives as Putman’s deﬁnition, who by anal-
ogy with notions of physical capital and human capital—tools and training that enhance individual
productivity—deﬁnes social capital as features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and
trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt.
The are two strands of the literature that are related to this paper. The ﬁrst one is related to
the literature on repeated game models and the second one is the literature on strategic network or
link formation.
Repeated game models usually ignore the role of social network formation and focus on random
pairwise matching of identical individuals, who may have diﬀerent histories of play (Ellison (1994),
Kandori (1992), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)). This approach has resulted on the well-
known Folk Theorem, which establishes that any payoﬀ larger than the minmax payoﬀ is supported
as a subgame perfect equilibrium by mean of strategies that either punish deviators or reward
conformers or use a mix of both.3 This result hinges on the existence of information ﬂows from each
pairwise match concerning past actions to the rest of the society. For instance, if someone does not
cooperate in a pairwise play of the prisoner’s dilemma game, there is someone else in the society
with whom there is a positive probability to be matched in the future who bcomes informed about
that player not cooperating in the past. This kind of modeling while interesting in its own right, it
ignores two crucial dimensions of social network which are (i) individual heterogeneity and (ii) that
social networks are endogenously formed, and therefore, so they are the interaction probabilities.
Other related papers are, Fujiwara-Greve (2001), Ghosh and Rey (1996), Datta (1996) and Kranton
(1996). Ghosh and Ray (1994) show that the presence of heterogeneity among agents coupled with
asymmetric information may induce players to cooperate even in the absence of information ﬂows.
Deviators face the potential cost of being matched with myopic players that never cooperate and
thereby non-myopic players may choose to cooperate after a testing period. In this paper, contrary
to Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), matched players may choose to continue a relationship instead
of being forced to separate. This combined with the potential cost of being matched with myopic
players, provide non-myopic players with incentives to cooperate. Kranton (1996) and Datta (1996)
show the existence of cooperative equilibria that are characterized by buildup of cooperation over
time when agents have incomplete information in the former and complete information in the latter.
The strategic network formation literature is concerned with obtaining the stable network forma-
tion where individuals’ decisions are to either form or not a link. Watts (2001) analyzes the process
of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever
links. She determines which network structures the formation process will converge to. Jackson and
Wolinsky 1996, Bala and Goyal (2000), and Jackson and Watts (1999) are also concerned with link
formation. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) examine a static model in which self-interested individu-
3The minmax payoﬀ is the minimum payoﬀ that a player may hold someone else when he plays his best response
to that strategy.
3als can form and sever links. They determine which networks are stable and which networks are
eﬃcient. Thus, they leave open the question of which stable networks will form. Bala and Goyal
(2000) simultaneously examine network formation in a dynamic setting. However, their approach
diﬀers from Watts (2001) in that Bala and Goyal restrict attention to models where links are formed
unilaterally; i.e., one player does not need another players permission to form a link in a nonco-
operative game and focus on learning as a way to identify equilibria. Jackson and Watts (1999)
also analyze the formation of networks in a dynamic framework. Jackson and Watts extend Watts’
model to a general network setting where players occasionally form or delete links by mistake; thus,
stochastic stability is used as a way to identify limiting networks. However, the paper closest to this
one is Goyal and Joshi (2003), who study a model where costly links are formed by mutual consent
and positve as well as negative spillovers between each link and the rest of the network are allowed.
By imposing assumptions on the marginal beneﬁts from links they derive the pairwise equilibrium
networks. In particular the impose in one version of the model that the gross marginal beneﬁto f
each link depends only on the number of links possesed by the individuals forming the link and
on the other version the marginal beneﬁt depends only on the number of own links and the total
number of links formed by the rest of the society.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the model is presented.
In the next section ??, the general model is analyzed. In section ??, the equilibrium is derived in
steady-state network. In the next section, section ??, the equilibrium outcomes are analyzed for
three evolving networks. In section ??, three applications are discussed at length and in the ﬁnal
section, concluding remarks are presented.
2 The Matching Game
2.1 The Static Game
The society consists on N +1inﬁnitely lived players who may interact through a collection of
inﬁnitely repeated games. At t =0 , before repeated interactions start, the N +1individuals choose
to form links with each other in a way that will be explained below and after that, at each period
t ≥ 1,p l a y e ri knows ni (g) individuals and he is matched with one of them, where ni (g) is the
cardinality of the set Ni (g) that is the set of individuals known by i,a n dg is the social network to
which player i belongs. The probability of being matched with player j ∈ Ni (g) is time independent
and given by pij (g). For each pair of players who actually interact, i,j ∈ g, the stage game they
play is an idionsyncratic prisoner’s dilemma (PD, hereafter) with a payoﬀ matrix given by:
D C
D d + Iijθ,d+ Iijθ b + Iijθ,0
C 0,b+ Iijθ c + Iijθ,c+ Iijθ
where, as customary, D stands for defection and C for cooperation and Iij is an indicator function
that takes the value 1 when i and j are a good match to each other and takes the value 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, the payoﬀs satisfy the following: b>c>d≥ 0.
It is assumed that each of the PD games are choice independent, in the sense that players’
decisions in the past do not restrict the feasible behavior in the future. They need not be, however,
strategically independent since the behavior in the future may be made contigent on the information
of what has occured in the past.
4A key aspect of the approach adopted here is that information on how players have behaved
in the past diﬀuses through the social network only gradually. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that,
player i is discovered by player j right after a deviation with probability πji(g).W h e n h e i s n o t
discovered right after he deviates, his defection will be forgotten in all subsequent periods. Thus,
information can range from atomized (people know only what has happened in their own interactions)
to comprehensive (people know what has happened in all previous interactions, and everything about
the game is common knowledge). The main implication of the assumption that πij (g) is network
dependent is that, in general, the architecture of the social network has bearing on the extent of
cooperation that the network can support in a self-sustainable fashion.4
Notice that when πij (g)=1for all ij pairs, the model corresponds to the one in which everyone
observes everyone else play in each period, while when πij (g)=0 , the model corresponds to the
other extreme when there is no information transmission between any given pair ij and the rest of
the society. So the model encompasses the two most emblematic repeated game models.
Finally, each individual discounts the future with a discount factor equal to δ.
2.2 Social Networks
By a social network it is understood a set of people or groups of people with some pattern of
interaction or “ties” between them. Friendship among a group of individuals, business relationships
between companies, church participation, marriages among individuals of the same race or religion
are all examples of social networks that have been studied in the past.
The social network or network of connections among individuals is described by a graph g ∈ G ≡ ©
g | g ⊆ gN+1ª
which is an N +1∗N +1matrix, where G is the set of graphs of N +1and gN+1 is
the complete network. Each element of g is denoted by ij and g is a symmetric matrix, i.e., ij = ji.
The set of i’s direct contacts is Ni (g) ≡ {j 6= i : ij ∈ g} which is of size ni (g).T h u s ,t h es i z eo fg
is n(g)=
P
i∈Nt ni (g)/2 and if ni (g)=v for all i ∈ N +1 ,t h e ng is a symmetric social network
of degree v, denoted by g(v). In addition, g + ij (resp. g − ij) denotes the network obtained by
adding (resp. substracting) the link formed by player i and j to (resp. from) g.
A network is connected if there exists a path between any pair ij ∈ N +1.An e t w o r kg0 ⊂ g is a
component of g if for all i,j ∈ g0, i 6= j,t h e r ee x i s t sap a t hi ng0 connecting i and j,a n df o ra l li ∈ g0
and k ∈ g, gik =1implies that k ∈ g0. A component is complete if gij =1for all i,j ∈ g0.T h e
complete network is a symmetric network of degree N for all i ∈ g(N), while the empty network is
as y m m e t r i cn e t w o r ko fd e g r e e0 for all i ∈ g(0).
A network is asymmetric when at least one pair of players have a diﬀerent number of links—that
is ni (g) 6= nj (g).
Let N1 (g), N2 (g),...,Nm (g) be a partition of players corresponding to the number of links that
players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),k=1 ,2,..,m if and only if ni (g)=nj (g).N o t e t h a t k refers to
the order in the partition and not the exact number of links that players have. An inter-linked stars
architecture has at least two members in the above partition, and the maximally and minimally
linked groups, respectively, satisfy the following two conditions: (i) ni (g)=N − 1 for i ∈ Nm (g)
and (ii) Ni (g)=Nm (g) for i ∈ N1 (g). The star network is an special case of such an architecture
with |Nm (g)| =1and |N1 (g)| = N − 1. An exclusive groups architecture is characterized by m +1
groups, a group of isolated players A1 (g) and m distinct groups of completely connected players,
4There are many diﬀerent ways in which information transmission can be introduced in the model, yet the one
chosen is the simplest one capable of creating network dependant strategic eﬀects.
5A2 (g),...,Am+1 (g). Thus, ni (g)=0 , for i ∈ A1 (g), while nj (g)=|Ax (g)| − 1, for j ∈ Ax (g) for
x ∈ {2,...,m +1 }. A special case of this architecture is the dominant group network in which there
is only one complete component and the rest of the players are isolated—that is m =1 .
2.3 Information Transmission and Matching Probabilities.
In order to focus on the role of social networks it is assumed that individual i’s pure actions are
observed by the current partner and with probability πij (g), i learns j’s history of play before
the stage game is played. If πij (g)=0for all ij pairs, then there is no information transmission
regarding past actions between two partners and the rest of the society while when πij (g) > 0 for at
least some ij pairs, then there is information transmission from partners to the rest of the society.
When πij (g)=1the interactions are perfectly embedded since i becomes complete informed about
the history of play of j. The information transmission probability from j to i satisﬁes the following:
πij (g):G −→ [0,1] and πij (g) ≥ 0 if and only if gij =1and πij (g)=0otherwise. That is,
individual i learns j’s history of play only if they form a link or know each other.
The matching probability between i and j satisﬁes the following: pij (g):G −→ [0,1] and
pij (g) ≥ 0 if and only if gij =1and pij (g)=0otherwise. That is, individual i and j are matched
to each other with positive probability in any given period if and only if they form a link or know
each other. Thus, while whether i and j are matched in any given period is random, i and j are
m a t c h e di na n yg i v e np e r i o di fa n do n l yi ft h e ya r el i n k e d .
2.4 Network Formation
Before the matching game starts all individual announce all the links that they want to form. For
all i,j ∈ N, sij =1if i wants to form a link with j,a n dsij =0otherwise. By convention sii =0 . A
link is created if and only if sij ∗ sji =1 . Links are thus created by mutual consent. Forming links
is not costless. Individual i’s cost of forming a link with individual j is ri (ni (g)).T h ec o s to fe a c h
link dependens on the network structure.
2.5 The Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept used is pairwise-equilibrium networks. That is the strategy proﬁle (si,a i)(g) ≡ ¡





(g) is sub-game perfect and no pair of players gains by altering the
current conﬁguration of links. Thus, g is a pairwise-equilibrium network (PWSE, here thereafter) if
and only if there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁle (si,a i)(g) which supports g and
is pairwise-stable.5
Let g ∈ G. Individual i’s expected payoﬀ is given by:












− ri (ni (g)),
where the strategy proﬁle (si,a i) has been ommited to save on notation, at
ij is player i’s action
when playing the stage game with player j in period t.
5The concept of sub-game perfection by itself is too weak a concept. In fact the empty network is always sub-game
perfect. More generally, for any pair i and j, it is always mutual best response for the players to oﬀer to form no link.
6Pairwise stability implies that for all ij / ∈ g,i fUi (g + ij) >U i (g) then Uj (g + ij) <U j (g).






















for all (si,a i) ∈ {0,1}
N ×{ C,D} and if Ui (g + ij) >U i (g) then Uj (g + ij) <U j (g).
In words, PWSE networks are such that no player gains by altering the current conﬁguration of
links, neither by adding a new link nor by eliminating any subset of existing links.
To simplify the analysis it is assumed that players rely only on trigger strategies. Player i coop-
erates against j if he has no information that j ever played D before, be it against i or against some
third party h. On the other hand, if player i gets information that j has defected (against i or h),
then i chooses defection himself against j in all interactions with j after receiving the information
on j’s defection. Mutul defections do not evoke sanctions, when it is a part of the prescribed pattern
of behavior. That is, if k defects against i in order to punish the latter for cheating j,t h e nk is
not cheating but rather carrying out a prescribed punishment, so others observing the defection
would not punish k in turn. It is also assumed that if k observes i cheating j then this is common
knowledge between k and i.
3 Preliminaries
Given any network g,p l a y e ri’s expected payoﬀ from following the trigger strategy given that each
of his links follows the trigger strategy is given by:




Player i’s expected payoﬀ from deviating during the simultaneous move game against partner k
and then conforming to the trigger strategy forever thereafter is given by:





j∈Ni(g)/k pij (g)[πji(g)dij +( 1− πji(g))cij]
´
.
The ﬁrst term is self-explanatory. The term in parenthesis includes three terms. The ﬁrst one is
the probability of being matched with player k and being punished by her forever thereafter. The
second one is the expected payoﬀ from being matched with someone who learned that i deviated in
the last period, which is equal to mutual defection, and the third term is the expected payoﬀ from
being matched with someone who did not learn that i deviated in the last period, which is equal
to mutual cooperation. In the last two terms the expected payoﬀ is taken over all i’s partners that
choose cooperation from the ﬁrst period onwards.
Player i cooperates in each encounter from time t onwards if and only if Vi (C) ≥ Vi (D)—that is,
δ ≥ δik (g) ≡
b − c




where πki =1 .
If there is no information transmission between any pair of individuals and the rest of the society—
that is the society is atomized—πji(g)=0for all j ∈ Ni (g) and for all i ∈ g, cooperation between
i and k is self-sustained if and only if δ ≥ δik (g) ≡ b−c
b−c+(c−d)pik(g) > 0 while if the society is fully
7embedded—that is πji(g)=1for all j ∈ Ni (g) and for all i ∈ g—cooperation between i and k is self-
sustained if and only if δ ≥ δik (g) ≡ b−c
b−c+(c−d)
S
j∈Ni(g) pij(g),w i t hδik (g) < 1. Furthermore, notice
that δik (g) <δ ik (g) < δik (g) as long as πji(g) ∈ (0,1) for some ji ∈ g. That is, network-based
eﬀects resulting from information transmissio nc a no n l yh e l pi ns u p p o r t i n gc o o p e r a t i o n .
In general the strength of those eﬀects depends positively on the number of neighbors a player
has, how valuable these are, and his information gathering eﬃciency. That is third-party sanctions
are more eﬀective as πji(g) increases.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) Player i and k cooperate in each encounter if and only if δ ≥ max{δik (g),δki (g)};




for all πji(g) and pij (g) and δik (g) is decreasing in πji(g) and
pij (g).
Given the condition in equation (1), the set of i’s direct contacts with whom cooperating is
self-sustainable can be deﬁned as Ci (g) ≡ {j ∈ Ni (g):δ ≥ max{δij (g),δji(g)}} and the set of i’s
direct contacts with whom cooperation is not self-sustainable is given by Di (g)=Ni (g)/Ci (g).
Notice that ni (g)=ci (g)+di (g).







pij (g)dij − ri (ni (g)).
Given the expected payoﬀ, individual i’s marginal gross return from establishing a link with
individual h—that is Ui (g + ih) − Ui (g)—is given by:
4Ui (g + ih,g) ≡

    
    
pih (g + ih)(u + Iihθ)+ P
j∈Ci(g)∩Ci(g+ih) [pij (g + ih) − pij (g)](c + Iijθ)+ P
j∈Di(g)∩Di(g+ih) [pij (g + ih) − pij (g)](d + Iijθ)+ P
j∈Di(g)∩Ci(g+ih) [pij (g + ih)(c + Iijθ) − pij (g)(d + Iijθ)]+ P
j∈Ci(g)∩Di(g+ih) [pij (g + ih)(d + Iijθ) − pij (g)(c + Iijθ)],
(2)
where u = c if ih ∈ Ci (g + ih) and u = d if ih ∈ Di (g + ih).
The ﬁrst term is the direct beneﬁt from adding one more link: pih (g + ih)(u + Iihθ) is i’s payoﬀ
from forming a link and entering in a long-run relationship with player h.T h es e c o n dt e r mi st h e
decrease in i’s expected payoﬀ from those relationships in which cooperation is self-sustainable before
and after the link ih is added and the third term is the decrease in i’s expected payoﬀ from those
relationships in which defecting is optimal before and after the link ih is added. The fourth term is
the change in i’s payoﬀ from those relationships in which cooperation was optimal before adding the
link ih and is no longer optimal after the link is added. The ﬁfth term is the change in i’s payoﬀ from
those relationships in which cooperation was not optimal before adding the link ih and is optimal
after the link is added. These last two terms arise when the threshold for the discount factor δik (g)
changes as the social network changes. Thus, adding one more link has a straightforward direct
eﬀect and two diﬀerent kind of indirect eﬀects: the ﬁrst one that is the change in the matching
probability between any pair of known players, and the second one that is the change in the optimal
strategy from defection to cooperation or vice-versa in some of i’s relationships—that is changes in
the severity of the punsihment as a result of changes in pji(g) and πji(g).
8It is clear from equation 2 that how fast the information ﬂows through the network changes only
the severity of the punishment while a change in the matching probability changes both the severity
of the punishment as the direct expected beneﬁto fa ne n c o u n t e r .
At the level of generality considered adding one more link then can either favor or instill cooper-
ation. That is, link formation may have either positive or negative spillovers on the welfare of other
individuals. In particular, on those who are connected to the individuals that form a link.
4T w o B e n c h m a r k s
4.1 Atomized Societies
In this section it is assumed that πij (g)=0 , pij (g)=p ≤ 1
N for all ij ∈ g and ri (ni (g)) = ni (g)r
for all i. That is the marginal cost of adding an extra links is constant. and individual i is informed
on the history of his own past interactions but he has no information on his partner’s past behavior.
In particular, he has no information on his partners’ behavior in interactions with third parties.
Thus, the way that player i treats his potential partner j when they meet depends only on their
past interactions. This case is then the analogue of the standard repeatead prisoner’s dilemma with
changing partners.
Notice that while we called this case atomized is not atomized in the way Granovetter suggests;
that is anonimous interactions in perfectly competi t i v em a r k e t s .I ti st r u eh e r et h a tt h i r dp a r t i e sd o
not aﬀect the actions taken by any given player, but individuls may interact over and over again with
the same group of individuals and have speciﬁc information on their behavior on past encounters,
which means that interactions are not anonymous.
In this case δik (g)=δ (p) ≡ b−c
b−c+p(c−d) for all ik ∈ g and for all g.N o t i c et h a tδ (p) decreases
in p, which in what follows it is called the intensity of a relationship. That is the more frequent i
and k interact the more likely that they cooperate.
In this case the marginal gross return becomes 4Ui (g + ih,g) ≡ pu,w h e r eu = c when δ ≥ δ(p)
and u = d when δ<δ (p).F u r t h e r m o r e , 4Ui (g + ih,g) is independent of the number of own
and third-party links—that is there is no network or spillovers eﬀects. In this case the following
proposition can be easily shown.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose that δ ≥ δ (p),i fpc ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE
networks, while if pc < r, then the empty network is the unique PWSE network; and
(ii) suppose that δ<δ(p),i fpd ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE network, while
if pd < r, then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
The intuition is simple. By adding links player i neither alters his incentives to cooperate nor
he changes other individuals’ incentives—that is if δ ≥ δ (p) cooperation takes place irrespective of
the number of links that any player may form. This implies that a link is created if and only if the
marginal beneﬁt, which is pu is larger than the marginal cost, which is r.
The intensity of a relationship also increases the incentive to form links. This implies that as p
increases the network becomes denser. This however is in stark form since the network may go from
the empty network to the complete network as p increases.











pd − ni (g)r

. (3)
This implies that the complete PWSE network is the only eﬃcient network when pu ≥ r,w h e r e
u = c if δ ≥ δ (p) and u = d otherwise, and the empty network is the unique eﬃcient network when
pd < r.
4.2 Embedded Societies
In this section it is assumed that πij (g)=π and pij (g)=p ≤ 1
N for all ij ∈ g and that ri (ni (g)) =
ni (g)r for all i. That is the marginal cost of adding an extra link is constant, and there is a positive
probability that each of player i’s partners learns the actions taken by him against a third party in
the last period . Notice that when π =1this is the analogue of the standard repeatead prisoner’s
dilemma with changing partners and perfect information ﬂows.
The assumptions πij (g)=π and pij (g)=p may seem extreme assumptions, yet they are less
extreme than in many repeated game models since they πij (g) > 0 and pij (g) > 0 if and only if i
and j form a link. Thus, while πij (g) and pij (g) do not depend on the number of links, they are
endogeneous in the sense that they are positive if and only if i and j choose to form a link.
An example that ﬁts well with this case when p and π are large is the one cited by Coleman
about Jewish diamond merchants in New York. According to Coleman they save a great deal in
lawyers’ fees by conducting their transactions informally. Sacks of jewels worth thousands of dollars
are lent for examination overnight without any contract signed. What makes associates not to shirk
their obligations is that anyone found guilty of malfesance can kiss good-bye his future chances of
being part of such a proﬁtable business. This occurs because merchants in this market belong to the
same tight social circle and information ﬂows well in that circle.
For all i ∈ g,p l a y e ri’s, relationships are all symmetric, and equation 1 becomes
δ ≥ δi (π,p) ≡
b − c
b − c +( c − d)p[1 + (ni (g) − 1)π]
,( 4 )
with ni (g) ≥ 1.
Notice that contrary to the atomized case, here, the number of own links that are willing to
cooperate changes the incentives to cooperate. In fact, adding links makes cooperation more likely
to be self-sustainable. The intuition is simple. The larger player i’s number of links, the larger the
expected punishment from deviating, since a defection by any player is punished by defection forever
thereafter by all i’s partners that become informed about his past actions against a third party.
Because δi (π,p) decreases as ni (g) increases, when the number of own links exceeds the threshold
˜ n(π,p) cooperation becomes self-sustainable. In what follows it is assumed that ˜ n(π,p) ≥ 2;t h a t
is, a necessary condition for player i to be willing to cooperate is that he has at least two partners.6
Under the assumptions made, player i’s set of cooperators Ci (g) is given by:
Ci (g) ≡
½
{j 6= i : j ∈ Ni (g),n j (g) ≥ ˜ n(π,p)} if ni (g) ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and
φ if ni (g) < ˜ n(π,p),
6If ˜ n(π,p)=1 , then if pc ≥ r, the only PWSE network is the complte network.
10and his marginal gross return becomes




pd for ni (g + ih) < ˜ n(π,p),
pd + p(c − d)ci (g + ih) for ni (g + ih)=˜ n(π,p),
pu for ni (g + ih) > ˜ n(π,p),
(5)
where ci (g + ih) denotes the cardinality of the set Ci (g + ih), u = c if nh (g + ih) ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and
u = d otherwise.
Lemma 3 Take any PWSE network g.I fpu ≥ r,w h e r eu = c if min{ni (g),n h (g)} ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and
u = d otherwise, then gih =1 .
Proof. Suppose that g is PWSE equilibrium network and gih =0 . Because 4Ui (g + ih,g) ≥ u
and 4Uh (g + ih,g) ≥ u since p(c − d)ci (g + ih) ≥ 0, 4Ui (g + ih,g) ≥ r and 4Uh (g + ih,g) ≥ r.
Thus, by pairwise stability i and h choose to form a link with each other.
This simple result carries important consequences for the network architecture. First, it implies
that in any PWSE network g all ih ∈ N pairs that yield a direct expected payoﬀ, pu, larger than the
cost of forming that link, r, must be linked. This implies that if pd ≥ r, everyone must be mutually
linked irrespective of whether cooperation is feasible or not.
It also implies that in any PWSE network g,i fpc ≥ r and min{ni (g),n h (g)} ≥ ˜ n(π,p),t h e n
i and h must be linked. Thus in a PWSE network, all individuals willing to cooperate must be
mutually linked. That is cooperators form a complete component of g.
The analysis is split in two cases: one in which N<˜ n(π,p) and the other in which N ≥ ˜ n(π,p).
The former corresponds to the case in which the number of potential links is so that cooperation is
not feasible and the latter assumes the opposite.
In the next proposition the case in which cooperation is not possible between any pair of players
is analyzed.
Proposition 4 Suppose that N<˜ n(π,p).
(i) If pd ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE network; and
(ii) if pd < r, then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
Given that the maximum number of possible links is lower than the minimum requiered for
cooperation between any pair of players to be self-sustainable, there is no network g that induces
cooperation. Lemma 3 ensures that when pd ≥ r, a link is formed.
Consider next the case in which N ≥ ˜ n(π,p); that is, for a suﬃciently dense network cooperation
is feasible.
Proposition 5 Suppose that N ≥ ˜ n(π,p).
(i) If pd ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE network;
(ii) if pc ≥ r>p d , then the complete and the empty network are the unique symmetric PWSE
networks and any asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture in which the
complete component has a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p);a n d 7
(iii) if pc < r, then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
7There is a multiplicity of equilibrium in the network formation process. We could have used other cooperative
reﬁnements as Strong Nash Equilibrium. In fact, under strong Nash the unique stron nash equilibrium network is
the complete network. Yet, strong Nash is harder to justify than pairwise equilibrium in a non-cooperative network
formation game.
11This proposition establishes that the number of own and third party links have positive spillover
eﬀects in the sense that the more links players have, the larger the incentive to form links and to
cooperate. Thus, large networks are more likely to induce cooperation and the larger the beneﬁts
from cooperation the larger the network. The intuition is simple. Given that cooperation is induced
by a social norm in which a deviating player is punished not only by the one being cheated, but
also by all those who become informed about a player’s defection, inducing cooperation requires a
minimum number of potential partners that can punish a deviator. Knowing few people in this case
is bad since by cheating a partner one risks to be punished by few people only and so the expected
punishment is small. Thus, in order to beneﬁt from cooperation, the network must have a minimum
density, as given by the average degree of links, and minimum span, as embodied by the relative size
of the largest component.
This result is partially driven by the fact that p and π are both constant in the number of own
and third-party links. If they were decreasing on the number of either own or third-party links or
both, the results may be reversed. This is discussed at length in the next section.
Notice also that the quality of information, which is assumed exogenous in the model, also aﬀects
the arquitecture of the PWSE network. Indeed, the more likely to learn a partner’s play in the last
period, the more likely is that individuals cooperate. As a consequence of this, each individual needs
to have a lower number of own links to be willing to cooperate. Thus, a smaller network is needed
to induce cooperation.
Proposition 6 As p and π increase, in a dominant group architecture the lowest degree of the
complete component decreases.
Proof. This follows from that ˜ n(π,p) is decreasing in (π,p) and that the complete component
in the dominant group architecture has a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p).











pd − rni (g)

.( 6 )
I ti se a s yt os e ef r o me q u a t i o n6t h a tt h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r ki st h eu n i q u ee ﬃcient network when
pu ≥ r,w h e r eu = c if δ ≥ δi (π,p) and u = d otherwise, and the empty network is the unique
eﬃcient network when pd < r. Thus, an asymmetric PWSE network is never eﬃcient. Ths reason
being that in an asymmetric network there are isolated players whose lack of interaction preclude
them from the beneﬁts of cooperation.
5 Generalizations
The two cases studied so far were intended to capture the main trade-oﬀ in extremely simple set-
ting. In particular, all links were assumed to be equally costly, all matches were assumed equally
productive and the interaction probability as the quality of information transmission were assumed
to be independent of the number of links. In this section, the model in sub-section 4.2 is used as
plataform for the analysis and each of the following sub-sections one of the assumptions is relaxed
in a ceteris-paribus fashion.
125.1 Increasing Marginal Costs
In this section we keep the assumptions that πij (g)=π, pij (g)=p and Iij =0for all ij ∈ g, but
it is assumed that the marginal cost of adding a link is strictly increasing in the number of own
links. In particular, it is assumed that ri (ni (g)) = r(ni (g))
2. Thus, the marginal cost of going
from ni (g)−1 to ni (g) links is given by (2ni (g) − 1)r and is increasing in the number of own links.
In this case each relationship is symmetric, and as before cooperation between i and any player
who is willing to cooperate is self-sustainable if and only if δ ≥ δi (π,p),w h e r et h el a t t e ri sg i v e n
by equation 4.
Given the assumptions made the marginal gross return is given by equation 5, and therefore
player i and h are willing to add a link if and only if
4Ui (g + ih,g) ≥ (2ni (g)+1 )r and 4Uh (g + ih,g) ≥ (2ni (g)+1 )r.
In the next proposition the case in which cooperation is not possible for any given number of
links between any pair of players is analyzed. Let deﬁne nL as the largest number of own links that
makes pd ≥ (2ni (g) − 1)r.
Proposition 7 Suppose that N<˜ n(π,p).
(i) If pd ≥ r, then the symmetric network g(nL) i st h eu n i q u eP W S En e t w o r k ;a n d
(ii) if pd < r, then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
Given that the maximum number of links is lower than the minimum requiered for cooperation
between any pair of players to be self-sustainable, there is no network g that induces cooperation.
Lemma 3 ensures that when pd ≥ max{(2ni (g) − 1)r,(2nh (g) − 1)r}, a link between i and h is
formed, and therefore, links are formed until pd ≥ (2ni (g) − 1)r.
Consider next the case in which N ≥ ˜ n(π,p)—that is, for a suﬃciently dense network cooperation
becomes feasible, and deﬁne nH as the largest number of own links that makes pc ≥ (2ni (g) − 1)r.
Proposition 8 Suppose that N ≥ ˜ n(π,p).
(i) Suppose that pd ≥ r.( a ) I f nL < ˜ n(π,p) and pc ≤ (2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r, the symmetric network
g(nL) i st h eu n i q u eP W S En e t w o r k ;( b )i fnL < ˜ n(π,p) and pc > (2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r, the symmetric
network g(nH) is a PWSE network, the symmetric network g(nL) and any asymmetric network that
has the exclusive groups architecture with two complete components: one with a degree of at least
˜ n(π,p) and at most nH and the other with degree nL are PWSE networks for nL < ˜ n(π,p)−1;( c )
if nL ≥ ˜ n(π,p), the symmetric network g(nH) is the unique PWSE network.
(ii) Suppose that pc ≥ r>p d .( a ) I f nL < ˜ n(π,p) and pc ≤ (2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r, the empty network
i st h eu n i q u eP W S En e t w o r k ;( b )i fnL < ˜ n(π,p) and pc > (2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r, the symmetric network
g(nH) is a PWSE network, the empty network and any asymmetric PWSE network that has the
dominant group architecture in which the complete component has a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p) and
at most nH and the rest are isolated players are PWSE networks for nL < ˜ n(π,p) − 1;a n d( c )i f
nL ≥ ˜ n(π,p), the symmetric network g(nH) i st h eu n i q u eP W S En e t w o r k;a n d
(iii) Suppose that pc < r. Then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
As expected when marginal cost of adding one more link is increasing in the number of links,
t h eP W S En e t w o r k sa r el e s sd e n s ea n dh a v eal o w e rs p a nr e l a t i v et ot h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h em a r g i n a l
cost is constant.
13What is more interesting is that when pd ≥ r two types of symmetric networks may form, one in
which there is no cooperation and each individual has nL links and one in which there is cooperation
and each individual has nH links while when marginal cost is constant a unique PWSE exists in
which every is mutually linked and cooperation occurs in all pair-wise matches. When an assymetric
network arises the society becomes segregated in two groups: a group of mutually linked players
that do not cooperate and another group of mutually linked players that cooperate. Thus, even in
societies that are complete homogeneous there are might be equilibria where some people do well
relatively to others.
5.2 Link Heterogeneity
In this section we keep the assumptions that πij (g)=π and pij (g)=p for all ij ∈ g and that
ri (ni (g)) = ni (g)r for all i, but heterogeneity in links’ payoﬀ is introduced. That is, some matches
y i e l da ne x t r ap a y o ﬀ equal to θ.. In what follows it is assumed that each player knows which links
yield the extra payoﬀ θ before they choose to form links. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed
that each individual has the same number of good links available that is assumed to be equal to
Ng +1 ,w i t hNg ≤ N and N even.
Notice that the extra payoﬀ θ reﬂects the quality of the match and not individual diﬀerences, and
therefore is not meant to capture diﬀerences in ability or in the willingness to cooperate. Indeed,
both good and bad links have the same threshold for self-sustainable cooperation and this is still
given by equation 4. Thus, under this formulation cooperation between i and j is still self-sustainable
if and only if min{ni (g),n j (g)} ≥ ˜ n(π,p), w h e r ew ek e e pt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a t˜ n(π,p) ≥ 2,8 and
hence the marginal gross return becomes




p(d + Iihθ) for ni (g + ih) < ˜ n(π,p)
p(d + Iihθ)+p(c − d)ci (g + ih) for ni (g + ih)=˜ n(π,p)
p(u + Iihθ) for ni (g + ih) > ˜ n(π,p),
(7)
where u = c if nh (g + ih) ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and u = d otherwise.
This lemma implies that 4Ui (g + ih,g) can be deﬁned as a function of (ni (g),n −i (g)).
Lemma 9 Take any PWSE network g.I f p(u + Iihθ) ≥ r,w h e r eu = c if min{ni (g),n h (g)} ≥
˜ n(π,p) and u = d otherwise, then gih =1 .
Proof. Suppose that g is PWSE equilibrium network and gih =0 .T h e n 4Ui (g + ih,g) ≥
u + Iihθ and 4Uh (g + ih,g) ≥ u + Iihθ, and since by hypothesis u + Iihθ ≥ r, 4Ui (g + ih,g) ≥ r
and 4Uh (g + ih,g) ≥ r. Thus, by pairwise stability i and h c h o o s et of o r mal i n kw i t he a c ho t h e r .
This simple result has powerful implications for the network structure that may arise in equi-
librium. First, it implies that in any PWSE network g all ih ∈ N pairs that yield a direct ex-
pected payoﬀ, p(u + Iihθ), larger than the cost of forming the link, r, must be linked. This implies
that if p(d + θ) ≥ r>p d , are all good links are formed irrespective of whether cooperation is
self-sustainable while this is not necessarily true for bad links. Thus in any PWSE network g,i f
p(d + θ) ≥ r the good links must form a complete component of g. That is all must be linked.
8If ˜ n(π,p)=1 , then as long as pc ≥ r, the only PWSE network is the complete network.
14Second, it implies that in any PWSE network g,i fp(c + Iihθ) ≥ r and min{ni (g),n h (g)} ≥
˜ n(π,p),t h e ni and h must be linked, i.e., gih =1 .T h u si nt h i sc a s ei na n yP W S En e t w o r kg,t h e
cooperators must form a complete component of g.
Third, it implies that in any PWSE network g if player i forms ni (g) links and ni (g) ≤ Ng,
then all his links are best links. This readily follows from the fact that player i knows ex-ante the
identity of all the potential links and that all links are equally costly.
The analysis is split in two cases: (i) N<˜ n(π,p) and (ii) N ≥ ˜ n(π,p). The latter can also be
split in two sub-cases: (i) c ≤ d+θ and (ii) c>d+θ. The former imposes that mutual defection in a
good link yields a larger payoﬀ than cooperation in a bad link while the latter imposes the opposite.
In the next proposition the case in which cooperation is not possible between any pair of players
is analyzed.
Proposition 10 Suppose that N<˜ n(π,p).T h e n ,( i )I fpd ≥ r, then the complete network is the
unique PWSE; (ii) if p(d + θ) ≥ r>p d , the dominant group network in which only best matches
are formed is the unique PWSE; (iii) r>p(d + θ), then the empty network is the unique PWSE;
Given that the maximum number of links available is lower than the minimum number of links
requiered to induce cooperation between any pair of players, there is no network g in which at least
some pair of players choose cooperation. Lemma 3, however, ensures that good links are formed
when p(d + θ) ≥ r.
Consider next the case in which N ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and d + θ ≤ c. In this case cooperation is always
better than defection irrespective of the quality of the link. That, the payoﬀ from cooperation in a
bad link is larger than the payoﬀ from defection in a good link.
Proposition 11 Suppose that N ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and d + θ ≤ c.
(i) If pd ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE network;
(ii) if p(d + θ) ≥ r>p d , then the complete network is the unique PWSE network if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1,
otherwise the complete network and any asymmetric network that has the exclusive groups architec-
ture with two complete components: one that has at least ˜ n(π,p) links per individual and the other
that has Ng links per individual are PWSE networks;
(iii) if pc ≥ r>p(d + θ), then the complete network, the empty network and any asymmetric net-
work that has the dominant group architecture with a complete component that has at least ˜ n(π,p)
links per individual is a PWSE network;
(iv) if p(c + θ) ≥ r>p c , then the empty network is the unique PWSE network if Ng <
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ,
the symmetric g(˜ n(π,p)), the empty network and the asymmetric network that has a dominant
group architecture with a complete component with ˜ n(π,p) links per individual are PWSE networks
if
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ≤ Ng < ˜ n(π,p), and the symmetric g(Ng), the empty network, and the asymmetric
network that has the dominant group architecture with a complete component with Ng links per in-
dividual is a PWSE network if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p);a n d
(v) if p(c + θ) <r , then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
Proof. see Appendix.
With heterogenous links, the PWSE networks are diﬀerent from those arising under homogeneous
links. In the two extreme cases pd ≥ r and p(c + θ) <r , the same PWSE networks arise, while when
r is between pd and p(c + θ) PWSE networks may drastically change. There are two types of social
15networks that have interesting properties. The ﬁrst one is the exclusive groups architecture with two
complete components: one that has at least ˜ n(π,p) links per individual and the other that has Ng
links per individual are PWSE networks. This social network has two distinctive features. First, the
society is segregated in two groups: one group conformed by good links but in which cooperation
does not take place and another group formed by good and bad links, but in which its members
cooperate in each encounter. The members of the second group are better-oﬀ since c>d+ θ.I n
addition, the size of the group of cooperators is non-increasing in π. The reason being that for any
number of links a larger π implies a larger expected punishment, and therefore less links are needed
to induce cooperation.
The second architecture is the dominant group architecture in which the society is segregated
in one group of individuals that cooperate among themselves and the rest are isolated individuals.
The group of cooperators is in general composed of both, good and bad links. The size of the group
of cooperators is non-increasing in π.
Finally, there is one interesting feature in some of the PWSE networks which is that individuals
form links that are not proﬁtable. The reason being that by doing so individuals are willing to
cooperate. That is, unproﬁtable links serve as a kind of commitment device that make cooperation
self-sustainable. This is the case for instance when p(c + θ) ≥ r>p cand
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ≤ Ng <
˜ n(π,p).
Consider next the case in which N ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and d + θ>c . That is defecting in a good link
yields a better payoﬀ than cooperating in a bad link.
Proposition 12 Suppose that N ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and d + θ>c .
(i) If pd ≥ r, then the complete network is the unique PWSE network;
(ii) if pc ≥ r>p d , then the complete network is the unique PWSE network if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1,
otherwise the complete network and any asymmetric network that has the exclusive groups architec-
ture with two complete components: one with at least ˜ n(π,p) links per individual and other with Ng
links per individual are PWSE networks;
(iii) if p(d + θ) ≥ r>p c , then the complete network and any asymmetric network that has the
dominant group architecture with a complete component with at least ˜ n(π,p) links per individual is
aP W S En e t w o r k ;
(iv) if p(c + θ) ≥ r>p (d + θ), then the empty network is the unique PWSE network if Ng <
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ , the symmetric g(˜ n(π,p)), the empty network and the asymmetric network that has a
dominant group architecture with a complete component with ˜ n(π,p) links per individual are PWSE
networks if
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ≤ Ng < ˜ n(π,p), and the symmetric g(Ng),t h ee m p t yn e t w o r k ,a n dt h e
asymmetric network that has the dominant group architecture with a complete component with Ng
links per individual is a PWSE network if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p);a n d
(v) if p(c + θ) <r , then the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
Proof. see Appendix.
5.3 Negative Network eﬀects on the Interaction Probability
One of the caveat of the model developed so farn an di t se x t e n s i o n si st h a tw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a t
the interaction probabilities as well as the probability of becoming informed are independent of the
16number of own and third-party links. Assuming that either of these or both change with the number
links increase substantially the complexity of model unless some speciﬁc assumptions concerning the
gross-marginal return are made. In this section, we do so.
I nw h a tf o l l o w si ti sa s s u m e dt h a tπij (g)=π(N (g),λ), pij (g)=p(N (g)), Iij =0for all ij ∈ g
and that ri (ni (g)) = ni (g)r for all i,w h e r eN (g) ≡ 1
2
P
k∈g nk (g) and π(N (g),λ) increases in λ.
That is the marginal cost of adding an extra links is constant, the probability that i learns j history
of play and the probability that i and j interact depend on the number of own and third-party links
and links are homogeneous. Under these assumptions player i is willing to cooperate if and only if
δ ≥ δ (N (g),n i (g)) ≡
b − c
b − c +( c − d)p(N (g))[1 + (ni (g) − 1)π (N (g),λ)]
.( 8 )
Furthermore, it is assumed that p(N (g))[1 + (ni (g) − 1)π (N (g),λ)] >p(N (g)+1 )[ 1+ni (g)π(N (g)+1 ,λ)].
That is, cooperation become harder to sustain as the number of own and third-party links increase.
In words this assumption means that being punished more frequently by less people is worse than
being punished less frequent by more people. So, the frequency of punishment is more important
than the number of punishers. Thus, it is assumed that there are negative spillovers from the number
of links to cooperation.9
This assumption results in that the set of cooperators is non-increasing in the number of own
and third-party links in any given network. That is, Ci (g + ih) ⊆ Ci (g), Di (g) ⊆ Di (g + ih) and
Di (g) ∩ Ci (g + ih)=φ.
In this case the marginal gross return Ui (g + ih) − Ui (g) becomes:




p(N (g)+1 )u +
P
j∈Ci(g+ih)∩Ci(g) [p(N (g)+1 )− p(N (g))]c+ P
j∈Di(g)∩Di(g+ih) [p(N (g)+1 )− p(N (g))]d+ P
j∈Ci(g)∩Di(g+ih) [p(N (g)+1 )d − p(N (g))c],
(9)
where u = c if δ ≥ max{δ (N (g),n i (g)),δ(N (g),n h (g))} and u = d otherwise.
Notice that the marginal gross return is at most p(g + ih)u since adding more links can only
decrease the incentives to cooperate and decrease the probability of interaction.
Following Goyal and Goshi (2003) it is assumed that the gross marginal return 4U (ni (g),n −i (g))
is decreasing in own and third-party links. We call the ﬁrst eﬀect, as they do, negative spillovers
on own links (NSOL) and the second eﬀect, negative spillovers on third-party links (NSTP). In
addition, to make the analysis interesting it is assumed that for any network g and any player i with
ni (g)=0 , δ ≥ δ(N (g),1).T h a ti s ,f o rp l a y e ri cooperation is self-sustainable when he has one link
only. If this is not the case then under no network cooperation would be self-sustainable.
Suppose a symmetric network of degree v, and lets denote by v(π) t h ed e g r e et h a ts a t i s ﬁes the
following, 4U (v,v) <r≤ 4U (v − 1,v − 1),and by v(δ,π) the degree that solves the following
δ = b−c
b−c+(c−d)p(N(g))[1+(ni(g)−1)π(N(g),λ)]. Thus, for any symmetric network of degree larger than
v(δ,π) cooperation is not self-sustainable. This implies that in symmetric network of degree v the
gross marginal return for any v ≤ v(λ,π) − 1 is given by:
9The case of positive spillovers resembles the one in which πij (g)=π and pij (g)=p. Thus, for the sake of brevity
the focus is on negative spillovers.
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(10)
The the following is shown in the appendix.
Proposition 13 Suppose that 4U (ni (g),n −i (g)) is decreasing in own and third-party links. If
4U (N,N) ≥ r, the complete network is the unique PWSE network, if p(1)c<r , the empty net-
work is the unique PWSE network and if p(g(1))c ≥ r>4U (N,N), then the unique symmetric
PWSE network has a degree v(π) ∈ {1,2,...,N − 1}.
(ii) if p(g(1))c ≥ r>p (g(N))d,t h e ng(˜ n) is the unique symmetric PWSE network and any
asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture in which the complete component
has a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p);
This proposition establishes that as long as p(g(1))c ≥ r, there is a unique symmetric PWSE
network and that the degree of this network is non-decreasing in λ. The intuition being simple. As
the number of links increases cooperation becomes harder to sustain since it has been assumed that
the frequency of punishment is more important than the number of punishers, and an increase in λ
increases the frequency of punishment. Since the frequency of punishment increases, more links can
be created before cooperation is destroyed.
This is
6 Social Capital
The idea of social capital goes back to Hobbes (1651) who says in Leviathan, “to have friends is
power”. There, he establishes a distinction between an individual’s social and political resources and
implies that a person’s living standard depends on the resources to his disposal. However, the modern
deﬁnition of social capital is due to the more recent work of two sociologists, Pierre Bordieu and
James Coleman. Bordieu deﬁnes social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bordieu 1985, p. 248; 1980). He argues that social networks
are not a natural given and must be constructed through strategic investments oriented to the
institutionalization of group relations that can be used to obtain other beneﬁts. Thus, Bordieu’s
deﬁnition makes clear that social capital is the result of social relationships that allow individuals
to get access to resources possessed by their partners or links and the amount and quality of the
resources owned by their partners.
Coleman’s deﬁnition is less precise. He deﬁnes social capital by its functions as “as a variety
of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and
they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure”
(Coleman 1988a. p. S98)
18The main diﬀerence between Bordieu and Coleman’s deﬁnition is that in the latter’s deﬁnition
there is no diﬀerence between the resources available per-se and the ability to obtain them by virtue of
membership in diﬀerent social networks. Equating social capital with the resources acquired through
it can easily lead to a tautology. Deﬁning social capital by its a posteriori results can only lead to a
empty concept. For instance, saying that successful societies posses social capital and unsuccessful
societies do not, is deﬁning social capital by its consequences and not by its determinants, and as
such, social capital is bound to have no distinct meaning.
According to Portes and Landolt (1996), Coleman’s focus only on the positive eﬀects of social
capital has resulted in that social capital has become a property of groups and even complete
nations, rather than of individuals. Collective social capital, cannot simply be the sum of individual
social capital if the latter is a resource available through social networks since the resources that
someone claims must come at the expense of others. A good example of the consequences that
equation social capital to its consequences is Putman’s (1993) deﬁnition of social capital. He,
by analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital—tools and training that enhance
individual productivity—deﬁnes social capital as features of social organization, such as networks,
norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual beneﬁt.
Social capital, as deﬁned by Coleman and Putman, is more and more seen as a key ingredient
in economic development around the world. For instance, studies of the rapidly growing economies
of East Asia almost always emphasize the importance of dense social networks. These networks,
often based on the extended family or on close-knit ethnic communities like the overseas Chinese,
are seen to be responsible for fostering trust, lowering transaction costs, and facilitating information
transmission. In fact, studies show that China’s extraordinary economic growth over the last decade
has depended less on formal institutions than on personal connections to allocate resources eﬃciently
and make contracts self-enforceable. Social capital has also been important in the development of
advanced Western economies. Mark Granovetter has pointed out that economic transactions like
contracting or job searches are more eﬃcient when they are embedded in social networks. Studies
of highly eﬃcient, highly ﬂexible industrial districts emphasize networks of collaboration among
workers and small entrepreneurs; e.g; Silicon Valley. The most complete evidence however in support
of social capital comes from micro-data drawing on sophistiacated measures of community networks,
the nature and extent of civic participation and exchanges among neighbors. In the OECD countries,
the most comprehensive ﬁnding is that controlling for other key variables, well-connected people are
more likely to be housed, healthy, hired and happy.
Social capital, in general, has entered economics as being an under-appreciated and independent
factor of production, which in general is considered to be complementary with human capital. The
reason being that human capital will amount to little unless the person having it can be in contact
to others to inform, correct, assist with and disseminate his work and/or ideas. Much of the interest
in social capital by economists has been fueled by deﬁnitions that include not only the structure
of social networks and social relations, but also behavioral dispositions such as trust, reciprocity,
and nonesty and institutional quality measures such as rule of law, contract enforceability, and
civil liberties and personal characteristic as social skills, charisma, intelectual skills. Examples of
behavioral dispositions are LaProta et al (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997). The former reports
a positive correlation of some measure of trust and judicial eﬃciency and the latter between the
same measure of trust and growth rate 10. An example of personal characteristic is Glaser et al.
10See Durlauf (2002) for a critique of the econometric methods used to identify the positive eﬀects of social capital.
19(2002) who deﬁne social capital as a person’s social characteristics—including social skills, charisma,
and of his Rodolex— which enables him to reap market and non-market returns from interactions
with others11. As such they claim that social capital can be seen as the social component of human
capital. Thus, economists studying the consequences of social capital have adopted deﬁnitions of
social capital that make no diﬀerence between the resources available per-se and the ability to obtain
them by virtue of membership in diﬀerent social networks and that mix its consequences and its
determinants.
Ac a u s a ld e ﬁnition of social capital is needed on two grounds: (i) ﬁrst to distinguish social capital
from other forms of capital so that social capital can have a distinct meaning, and (ii) to implement
empirical strategies capable of identifying the empirical beneﬁts and “costs” of social capital.
In our view the results in this paper provide a framework that allows us to proposed a deﬁnition
capable of providing social capital with a distinct conceptual and empirical meaning. Before doing
so is important to emphasize the minimum conditions that a deﬁnition of social capital capable of
achieving above goals should satisfy.
First, as suggested by Portes and Landolt (1996) already is important that any deﬁnition of social
capital focuses on its sources rather than its consequences—that is on what social capital is and not
in what it does. This immediately eliminates any behavioral disposition as trust or reputation from
the deﬁnition of social capital. Trust or reputation from an economic point of view is more frequent
understood as the outcome of repeated interactions in which individuals follow self-enforcing behavior
that creates a reputation of taking certain actions. Second, social capital cannot be deﬁned over
an aggregate it has to be deﬁned at the individual level, and this must obtained through personal
costly investments oriented to the institutionalization of group relations that can be used to obtain
other beneﬁts—that is social capital cannot be thought of as a natural given.
Given these two conditions, social capital is deﬁned as follows: An individual social capital refers
to the number and type of costly links formed by mutual consent with the goal of achieving certain
personal ends that cannot be achieved in the absence of them.
This deﬁnition makes clear that social networks are costly to form and maintain. That is,
individuals has to spend resources—being those time, eﬀort, physical resources— to form and maintain
links. Second, while belonging to a given social network is a necessary condition for having access
to the potential resources or beneﬁts that a network may create, it is far from being a suﬃcient
condition. To get large beneﬁts from being part of a social network requires certain recognition or
reputation within the network. Those lacking that recognition are unlikely to get the extra beneﬁts
from being part of a social network and some network architectures do not provide enough incentives
to invest in developing that reputation or recognition. In our speciﬁc context, the reputation or
recognition of an indiviudual is an attributed or characteristic ascribed to him by his partners,
and the empirical basis of an individual’s reputation is his observed past behavior, and not the
participation on the netwrok per-se. Third, sometimes the same ties that members of a social network
h a v ea n dh e l pt h e mt oo b t a i ne x t r ab e n e ﬁts exclude others from these beneﬁts. One example of this is
the tight control exercised by descendants of Iatalians, Irish, and Polish immigrants over construction
trades and ﬁre and police unions in New York. Another example is Adam Smith’s complain that
assemblages of merchants inevitably end up as “conspiracies against the public”, where the public
are all those excluded from the networks and mutual support linking insiders. Fourth, social capital
is not deﬁned by its outcome and much less by whether this outcome is pareto-eﬃcient. This avoids
11This deﬁnition however does not suﬀer from Portes and Landolt’s critique that social capital cannot be thought
of as a community based attribute.
20the tautology of saying that successful people (nations) succeed, which result from confusing social
capital with the beneﬁts of it. Last but not least, this deﬁnition also emphasizes that person’s social
capital is not only given by the number of own links, but also to the type of links since not all links
have the same value. This value depends on the structural characteristics of the relations and in
fact an indiscriminate increase in the number of friends, links or social contacts may lead to the
destruction of social capital. Thus, the common aphorism “It is not what you know, it’s who you
know” describe quite well what we believe is a good working deﬁnition of social capital.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that Granovetter’s inside that economic transactions are embedded in
ongoing social relationships has bite on the kind of transactions that can be achieved and the beneﬁts
and costs of diﬀerent transactions. While this conclusion may seem relatively obvious, until recently
economics was not much willing to incorporate this kind of analysis to standard economic modeling.
Thus, as simple as this conclusion may be it is not irrelevant since it may help to understand real
life phenomena that otherwise would not be possible.
Indeed, it allows as to come with what we believe is a deﬁnition of social capital capable of
distinguishing social capital from other forms of capital so that social capital can have a distinct
meaning, and of allowing empirical strategies capable of identifying the empirical beneﬁts and “costs”
of social capital.
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Proof. of proposition 5.
Cases (i) and (iii) are straightforward.
(ii) Suppose that g = g(N).T h e np l a y e ri’s payoﬀ from this network is Ui (g(N)) = N (pc − r).
Adding links is not possible. Suppose then now that player i deletes n links. Doing so it yields a
payoﬀ equal to (N − n)(pu − r),w h e r eu = c if n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p) and u = d otherwise. By simple
observation it readily follows that this payoﬀ is lower than Ui (g(N)) for all n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p).T h u s ,
deleting n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p) number of links it is never optimal when the other players choose to form
links with everyone else. What about deleting n>N−˜ n(π,p) links if possible. Then, the diﬀerence
between Ui (g(N)) and the payoﬀ when n links are deleted is given by:
Np(c − d)+n(pd − r) ≥
Np(c − d)+N (pd − r)=
N (pc − r) > 0.
Thus, deleting n>N− ˜ n(π,p) links is never optimal. This implies that g(N) is a PWSE
network since adding more links is impossible and deleting any number of links is never optimal.
Consider an asymmetric network g.L e tN0 (g), N1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NN (g) be a parti-
tion of players corresponding to the number of links that players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),k=1 ,2,..,N
if and only if ni (g)=nj (g),w h e r ek refers to the exact number of links that players in partition
k have. Let also denote by N˜ n (g) the partition conformed by all players that have exactly ˜ n(π,p)
links. By lemma 3, pc ≥ r implies that all players belonging to a partition with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1
links must be mutually linked. Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p)−1 and j ∈ Nk0 (g),
k0 =1 ,2,..,N, and suppose that gij =1 .T h e np l a y e ri has an incentive to delete this link since by
doing so it saves r and looses pd and pd − r<0. Thus, the only asymmetric PWSE networks are
those in which there are two components, one in which players have no links and one in which all
players are mutually linked and therefore each has the same number of links k ≥ ˜ n(π,p).T h a ti s ,
any asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture with a complete component
with a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p).
Proof. of proposition 8.
(i) If pd ≥ r, there are three diﬀerent cases to consider: (i) nL is lower than ˜ n(π,p) and pc ≤
(2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r; (ii) nL is lower than ˜ n(π,p) and pc > (2˜ n(π,p) − 1)r; and (iii) nL is larger than
or equal to ˜ n(π,p).
Case (a) follows directly from lemma 3.
Case (b). Notice that in this case the marginal cost is below the marginal gross return up to nL,
is above the marginal gross return between nL and ˜ n(π,p), below the marginal gross return between
˜ n(π,p) and nH and above again for all ni (g) >n H.W ec o n s i d e rﬁrst the symmetric networks and
then the asymmetric ones.
Consider the symmetric network g(nH).N o t i c et h a tp l a y e ri’s payoﬀ from this network is given
by Ui (g(nH)) = nH (pc − rnH) for all i. Adding a link yields pc − r(2nH +1 )which by deﬁnition
of nH is negative. What about deleting links Suppose that player i deletes n ≤ nH − ˜ n(π,p),t h e n
his payoﬀ from this strategy is (nH − n)(pc − r(nH − n)), which is lower than Ui (g(nH)).T h u s ,i t
is never optimal to delete n ≤ nH − ˜ n(π,p) links. What if he deletes nH − nL ≥ n>n H − ˜ n(π,p).
Notice that by lemma 3 it is never optimal to delete more than nH − nL.I nt h i sc a s ep l a y e ri has
two types of links, those with nH links and those with nH − 1 links. Since his number of links now
25becomes lower than ˜ n(π,p), he is not willing to cooperate with any of his partners and therefore he
is better-oﬀ deleting nH − nL links since all links in this range now yield a negative marginal net
return. The payoﬀ in this case becomes nL (pd − rnL), which is lower than Ui (g(nH)). Thus, it is
never optimal to delete nH −nL ≥ n>n H − ˜ n(π,p) number of own links. Thus g(nH) is a PWSE
network.
Consider now the symmetric network g(nL). By lemma 3 it is never optimal to delete any number
of links. Suppose now that i and h choose to form a link. Then the net payoﬀ from this extra link
is pd − r(2nL +1 )if nL < ˜ n(π,p) − 1 and pc − r(2nL +1 )if nL =˜ n(π,p) − 1. In the former case
the marginal net return is negative while in the latter is positive. Thus g(nL) is a PWSE network if
and only if nL < ˜ n(π,p) − 1. This also implies together with lemma 3 that if nL =˜ n(π,p) − 1, the
only PWSE network is g(nH).
Consider now an asymmetric network g. By lemma 3, every player forms at least nL num-
ber of links and at most nH since adding more links yields a negative net marginal beneﬁt. Let
NnL (g), NnL+1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NnH (g) be a partition of players corresponding to the
number of links that players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),k=1 ,2,..,N if and only if ni (g)=nj (g),
where k refers to the exact number of links that players in partition k have. Because pc ≥
max{(2ni (g) − 1)r,(2nj (g) − 1)r} for every player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1 and j ∈ Nk0 (g)
with k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1, lemma 3 implies that i and j must be linked. Thus, all players with a
number of own links k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 must be mutually linked. Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g)
with k<˜ n(π,p) − 1 and j ∈ Nk0 (g),k 0 = nL,n L +1 ,..,nH,t h e ngij =0since the ij link yields
pd − (2ni (g) − 1)r<0 to player i. Thus, the only asymmetric PWSE networks are those in which
there are two components, one in which players have nL links and the other one given by a complete
component in which all players have the same number of links nH ≥ k ≥ ˜ n(π,p).T h a t i s , a n y
asymmetric PWSE network has the exclusive groups architectures with two complete components:
one with a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p) and at most nH and the other with degree nL.
Case (c) By lemma 3, each player has an incentive to form all those links which yield a positive
net marginal return. This implies that each player forms nH and this is the unique PWSE network.
(ii) Suppose now that pc ≥ r>p d .The symmetric network g(nH) is a PWSE network and the
proof is the same as the one above. The empty network is also a PWSE since deleting links is not
possible and adding a link yields a net marginal return of pd−r<0. Thus the symmetric networks
g(nH) and g(0) are the unique PWSE networks.
Any asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture with a complete component
with a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p) and the rest are isolated players. The proof is ommited since it is
the same as above but now the partition of g allows players with a number of links lower than nL.
(iii) If pc < r, the the marginal gross return is always smaller than the marginal cost of adding
a link, and therefore the empty network is the unique PWSE network.
Proof. of proposition 11.
Cases (i) and (v) are straightforward.
(ii) Suppose that p(d + θ) ≥ r>p d . Because p(d + θ) >rall good links are formed. Consider
the complete network ﬁrst. Player i’s payoﬀ from g(N) is given by Ui (g(N)) = N (pc − r)+Ngpθ.
Suppose now that player i deviates and chooses to delete n bad links. A player never deletes a good
link since p(d + θ) >r . Deleting n ≤ N − Ng bad links yields a payoﬀ equal to (N − n)(pu − r)+
pNgθ,w h e r eu = c if n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p) and u = d otherwise. By simple observation it readily follows
that this payoﬀ is lower than Ui (g(N)) for all n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p). Thus, deleting n ≤ N − ˜ n(π,p)
number of links it is never optimal when the other players choose to form links with everyone else.
26What about deleting N −Ng ≥ n>N− ˜ n(π,p) bad links if possible. Then, the diﬀerence between
Ui (g(N)) and the payoﬀ when n bad links are deleted is given by:
Np(c − d)+n(pd − r) ≥
Np(c − d)+N (pd − r)=
N (pc − r) > 0.
Thus, deleting N −Ng ≥ n>N− ˜ n(π,p) bad links is never optimal. This implies that g(N) is
a PWSE network since adding more links is impossible.
Consider now the symmetric network in which all best links are formed, denoted by g(Ng).I f
Ng < ˜ n(π,p)−1,t h en e t w o r kg(Ng) is a PWSE equilibrium network. Deleting links is never optimal
because of lemma 9. Furthermore, no pair has an incentive to add a link, since adding a link yields
a marginal net return of pd − r<0.W h e r e a s i f Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1,a n yt w op l a y e r si and j with
gij =0 , has an incentive to form that link since it yields a marginal net return of pc −r>0.T h u s ,
g(Ng) is a PWSE network if and only if Ng < ˜ n(π,p) − 1.
It follows from 9 that no other symmetric network can be a PWSE network.
Consider now an asymmetric network g. By lemma 9 in a PWSE network g, each player has
at least ni (g) ≥ Ng number of links and if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1, the only PWSE network is the
complete network since any two players i and j has incentive to deviate and form a new link
because the new link yields pc − r>0. Suppose then that Ng < ˜ n(π,p) − 1 and let NNg (g),
NNg+1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NN (g) be a partition of players corresponding to the number of
links that players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),k= Ng,N g +1 ,..,N if and only if ni (g)=nj (g),w h e r e
k refers to the exact number of links that players in partition k have. Because pc > r every player
i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1 must be linked to all other players j ∈ Nk0 (g) with k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1.
Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p) − 1 and j ∈ Nk0 (g),k 0 = Ng,N g +1 ,..,N,a n d
suppose that Iij =0and gij =1 . Then player i has an incentive to delete the ij link since it yields
pd − r<0. Thus, this implies that in any PWSE asymmetric network every one has at least Ng
links and that all players that have a number of links k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) must be mutually linked. Thus, if
Ng < ˜ n(π,p)−1 an asymmetric PWSE network is one in which there are at most two components:
a fully connected component in which each player has Ng good links and another fully connected
component that has M ≥ ˜ n(π,p) ≥ 2 players..
(iii) pc ≥ r>p (d + θ). As in case (ii) the complete network is PWSE network and the proof
is the same. But now the empty network is also a PWSE network. The proof being trivial. Now
however the network in which only all good matches are formed is not a PWSE network. Suppose
that Ng < ˜ n(π,p) − 1 and that g(Ng) is a PWSE network. Then any player deleting a link looses
p(d + θ) and saves r. Since p(d + θ) <r , the deviating player is better-oﬀ. Suppose now that
Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 and that gih =0 .T h e ni fp l a y e r si and h deviate and form a link, each will have
˜ n(π,p) connections and therefore cooperation becomes self-sustainable for them. Forming the link
then yields to each player a net marginal beneﬁto fpd+p(c − d)ci (g + ih)−r ≥ 0 and therefore it
is worthwhile to form that link. Thus g(Ng) cannot be a PWSE network.
Consider now an asymmetric network g.L e t N0 (g), N1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NN (g) be
a partition of players corresponding to the number of links that players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),
k =0 ,1,..,N if and only if ni (g)=nj (g),w h e r ek refers to the exact number of links that players
in partition k have. Because pc ≥ r every player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 must be linked to
every player j ∈ Nk0 (g) with k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1. Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p)−1
and j ∈ Nk0 (g),k 0 =1 ,2,..,N, and suppose that gij =1 ,t h e np l a y e ri deletes the link since it
27yields p(d + Iijθ) − r<0. Thus, this implies that any PWSE asymmetric network has a complete
component in which each player has k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) number of own links and the rest are isolated
players. Thus, any asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture.
(iv) p(c + θ) ≥ r>p c .I fNg ≥ ˜ n(π,p),t h e ng(Ng) and the empty network are PWSE networks.
Player i’s payoﬀ from g(Ng) is Ui (g(Ng)) = Ng (p(c + θ) − r). If any two disconnected players form
a link, each gets a net payoﬀ of pc − r<0, and therefore no pair of players have an incentive to
add a link. Furthermore no player i has an incentive to delete links because that eliminates links
that are proﬁtable and may, depending of how many links are deleted, destroy cooperation between
i and all his partners.
Consider now the case in which Ng ≤ ˜ n(π,p)−1 and the symmetric network g(˜ n(π,p)).P l a y e r
i’s payoﬀ from this network is Ui (g(˜ n(π,p))) = ˜ n(π,p)(pc − r)+Ngpθ. Adding a link is never
optimal since it yields pc − r<0.I f p l a y e r i deletes a link he destroys cooperation with all
his partners since ni (g) becomes lower than ˜ n(π,p), then if he is willing to delete a link, he is
better-oﬀ deleting all links since p(d + θ) < 0.H i s p a y o ﬀ from deleting all his links is 0. So, if
Ui (g(˜ n(π,p))) ≥ 0, it is not optimal for player i to delete any number of links. This condition
implies that ˜ n(π,p)(pc − r)+Ngpθ ≥ 0 or that Ng ≥
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ > 0, where
(r−pc)
pθ < 1.T h u s ,
g(˜ n(π,p)) is a PWSE network if Ng ≥
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ .
Consider now any asymmetric network g.L e tN0 (g), N1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NN (g) be a
partition of players corresponding to the number of links that players have. Because p(c + θ) ≥ r
every player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 must be linked to every player j ∈ Nk0 (g) with
k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1 when the ij link is a good link. Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p)−1
and j ∈ Nk0 (g), k0 =1 ,2,..,N,w i t hgij =1 .T h e n p l a y e r i deletes the ij link since it yields
p(d + Iijθ) − r<0. Next, consider player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and player j ∈ Nk0 (g) with
k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p) with Iij =0and gij =1 .I fk>˜ n(π,p),t h e ni deletes the ij since it yields pc − r<0
and does not kill cooperation between i and his other partners. If k =˜ n(π,p),d e l e t i n gt h eij link,
kills cooperationg with all his partners, and since p(d + Iijθ) − r<0, if he deletes the ij link he is
better-oﬀ deleting all his links. Thus, it is optimal not to delete any number of own links as long
as Ng ≥
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ,o t h e r w i s ei deletes all his links. So far, this implies that in any asymmetric
PWSE network there is one component in which each individuals has at least k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) links.
If Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p), then any asymmetric network has complete component in which each player
has a number of links equal to Ng, and the rest are isolated players is a PWSE network. While if
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ≤ Ng ≤ ˜ n(π,p) − 1, an asymmetric network with one component in which each player
has ˜ n(π,p) links and the rest are isolated players is a PWSE network. If Ng <
˜ n(π,p)(r−pc)
pθ ,t h e r ei s
no asymmetric PWSE network.
Proof. of proposition 12
Cases (i) and (v) are straightforward.
(ii) pc ≥ r>p d .The proof is the same as the one in case (iv) in proposition 11..
(iii) if p(d + θ) ≥ r>p c . By lemma 9, all good links are formed. If Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p),t h e n
g(Ng) is the unique PWSE network since no one has incentive either to add a link or to delete
one. If Ng ≤ ˜ n(π,p) − 1,t h e ng(˜ n(π,p)) is a PWSE network if and only if Ui (g(˜ n(π,p))) ≥
Ui (g(Ng)) for all i because adding a link yields pc − r<0 and deleting a link kills cooperation
and therefore, if it is worthile to delete one bad link it is optimal to delete all the bad links since
each yield a negative net marginal payoﬀ.T h u s , g(˜ n(π,p)) is a PWSE network if and only if
˜ n(π,p)(pc − r)+Ngpθ ≥ Ng (p(d + θ) − r);t h a ti s ,Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p)
r−pc
r−pd.O t h e r w i s e , g(Ng) is a
28PWSE network if Ng < ˜ n(π,p) − 1 or Ng =˜ n(π,p) − 1, but Ng <
r−pc
p(c−d).
Consider now an asymmetric network g.B yl e m m a9i naP W S En e t w o r kg, each player has at
least ni (g) ≥ Ng number of links and if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p),t h e ng(Ng) is the unique PWSE network.
Suppose then that Ng ≤ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 and let NNg (g), NNg+1 (g),...,N˜ n (g),N˜ n+1 (g),...,NN (g) be a
partition of players corresponding to the number of links that players have. Because p(c + θ) ≥ r
every player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 must be linked to all other players j ∈ Nk0 (g) with
k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 if the ij link is a good link, while if Iij =0and gij =1 , k =˜ n(π,p) − 1 and
k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1,ideletes the links since it yields pd−r<0. Take now any ij link where i ∈ Nk (g)
with k<˜ n(π,p) − 1, j ∈ Nk0 (g), k0 = Ng,N g +1 ,..,N, Iij =0and gij =1 . Then player i deletes
this link since it yields pd − r<0. Next, consider player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and player
j ∈ Nk0 (g) with k0 ≥ ˜ n(π,p) with Iij =0and gij =0 ,t h e ni and j has no incentive to add the link
ij since adding that links yields a net marginal beneﬁte q u a lt opc−r<0. So far, this implies that
in any asymmetric PWSE network a component given by the good links with the number of links
k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) must be formed.
Finally, consider a player i ∈ Nk (g) with k =˜ n(π,p) − 1 and a player j ∈ Nk0 (g) with k0 =
˜ n(π,p) − 1 with Iij =0 , then ij has an incentive to add the link when the net marginal beneﬁti s
positive. That is, when pc + Ngp(c − d)+(˜ n(π,p) − 1 − Ng)p(c − d) − r ≥ 0.T h u s ,t h eij link is
formed if and only if ˜ n(π,p) ≥
r−pd
p(c−d).
Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p) − 1 and j ∈ Nk0 (g),k 0 =1 ,2,..,N,a n d
suppose that Iij =0and gij =1 , then player i deletes the link since it yields pd − r<0. Thus,
this implies that any PWSE asymmetric network has a complete component given by all players
that have k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) and all the players in that component has the same number of links. Thus, if
Ng < ˜ n(π,p)−1 the only candidate for an asymmetric PWSE network is the one in which there are
two components: one in which all players have Ng links and the other is the complete component
given by all players with ˜ n(π,p) good links and the rest Ng − ˜ n(π,p) are bad links if Ng ≥ ˜ n(π,p).
(iv) p(c + θ) ≥ r>p(d + θ). The proof is the same as the one in case (iv) in proposition 11.
Proof. of proposition 13.
Let g be a symmetric network of degree v. If r>4U (1,0)=p(1)c, then the empty network is
clearly a PWSE network. If 4U (N,N) ≥ r, then the complete network is clearly a PWSE network.
No more links can be added and NSOL implies that 4U (v,N − 1) > 4U (N − 1,N − 1) ≥ r for all
v ≤ N − 2. Hence no player has any incentive to delete any number of links. Finally, suppose that
4U (v,v) <r≤ 4U (v − 1,v − 1) for some v ∈ {1,2,..n − 2}. Because 4U (v,v) <r ,no player
has an incentive to add a link, while NSOL implies that 4U (l,v − 1) > 4U (v − 1,v − 1) for all
l ∈ {1,2,..v− 2}, which implies that no player has an incentive to delete links either. Thus a network
of degree v is a PWSE network. The uniqueness follows from that 4U (v,v) <r≤ 4U (v − 1,v − 1)
and 4U (v0,v0) <r≤ 4U (v0 − 1,v0−1) cannot be simultenously satisﬁed for v and v0,w i t hv>v 0.
Consider any asymmetric PWSE network g.L e tN1 (g), N2 (g),...,NN (g) be a partition of players
corresponding to the number of links that players have, i.e., i,j ∈ Nk (g),k=1 ,2,..,N if and only
if ni (g)=nj (g),w h e r ek refers to the exact number of links that players in partition k have.
Take any two players i ∈ Nk (g) and h ∈ Nk0 (g) with δ ≥ max{δ (N (g),n i (g)),δ(N (g),n h (g))}
and gih =1 . Then all players with degrees smaller than min{k,k0} must be mutually linked.
This follows from that if min{4U (ni (g),n −i (g)),4U (nh (g),n −h (g))} ≥ r, then it must be true
for any player j ∈ Nk (g) with k ≤ min{k,k0} and player l ∈ Nk0 (g) with k0 ≤ min{k,k0} that
min{4U (nk (g),n −k (g)),4U (nl (g),n −l (g))} ≥ r. Likewise if any two players do not have a link
29then all players with more links must not be linked to each other because of NSOL and NSTP. This
rules out inter-linked stars with two or more central players but it allows stars to arise in equilibrium.
Consider now any dominant group architecture with two or more isolated players.
implies that every player i ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p) − 1 must be linked to all other players
j ∈ Nk (g) with k ≥ ˜ n(π,p)−1. Take now any player i ∈ Nk (g) with k<˜ n(π,p)−1 and j ∈ Nk (g),
k =1 ,2,..,N, and suppose that gij =1 .T h e np l a y e ri has an incentive to delete this link since by
doing so it saves r and looses pd and pd − r<0. Thus, the only asymmetric PWSE networks are
those in which there are two components, one in which players have no links and the other one given
by a complete component in which all players have the same number of links k ≥ ˜ n(π,p).T h a ti s ,
any asymmetric PWSE network has the dominant group architecture with a complete component
with a degree of at least ˜ n(π,p)
30